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Erosion and Variety in Pay for High Public Office
Author(s) -
PETERS B. GUY,
HOOD CHRISTOPHER
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
governance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.46
H-Index - 76
eISSN - 1468-0491
pISSN - 0952-1895
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0491.1995.tb00205.x
Subject(s) - variety (cybernetics) , explanatory power , public sector , democracy , private sector , economics , purchasing , purchasing power , power (physics) , public economics , business , political science , economic growth , economy , politics , macroeconomics , law , philosophy , physics , epistemology , quantum mechanics , artificial intelligence , computer science , operations management
Two elements have characterized the rewards for public officials in the past two decades. One is the erosion of pay and perquisites in many democratic countries. The other is a continuing variety of rewards, especially when compared to those in the private sector. Using data from a variety of OECD countries and the European Union, this article investigates alternative explanations for these two elements. The data is adjusted for purchasing power of the different currencies and then related to the relative wealth of the countries. We find that ideas, interests and institutions all have some explanatory power, but that none is sufficient by itself to explain either variety or erosion in pay across the range of countries. The policy implications of these findings, in terms of both “how” and “how much” public officials should be paid, are also examined.