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Bureaucratic Professionalization and the Limits of the Political Control Thesis: The Case of the Federal Trade Commission
Author(s) -
EISNER MARC ALLEN
Publication year - 1993
Publication title -
governance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.46
H-Index - 76
eISSN - 1468-0491
pISSN - 0952-1895
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0491.1993.tb00141.x
Subject(s) - bureaucracy , agency (philosophy) , professionalization , commission , politics , public administration , presidential system , enforcement , political science , control (management) , economics , law , sociology , management , social science
This article explores the political control thesis in light of the literature on bureaucratic politics and agency professionalization. It argues that existing studies of political control have been limited by a failure to analyze the impact of organizational factors on policy change. The article tests political‐control and bureaucratic hypotheses through an analysis of changing enforcement priorities at the Federal Trade Commission, The results suggest that the growing role of economists in the agency, rather than congressional oversight or presidential appointments, is critical in explaining the changing antitrust priorities of the Federal Trade Commission.