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The Anti‐Collusion Toolkit: Limits of a Policy that Combats the Facilitation of Collusion
Author(s) -
Mezzanotte Félix E
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
european law journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1468-0386
pISSN - 1351-5993
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0386.2011.00562.x
Subject(s) - collusion , discretion , enforcement , remedial education , harm , competition (biology) , merger control , competition law , treaty , law and economics , facilitation , business , competition policy , political science , public administration , economics , european union , law , industrial organization , international trade , microeconomics , ecology , commission , biology , monopoly
This paper identifies key obstacles of law enforcement that may frustrate a policy that fights the facilitation of collusion. It outlines remedial actions against features that facilitate collusion and examines to what extent authorities––such as Directorate General (DG) for Competition, National Competition Authorities and regulators––have the powers and ability to take these actions. The analysis covers a number of legal tools including the theory of harm of coordinated effects in European merger control, Articles 101 and 102 Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union, stricter national laws and regulation. I conclude that DG Competition has little powers to act, except for merger control. Although NCAs and regulators may enjoy broader powers, tough challenges lie ahead in terms of the exercise of discretion, error and effectiveness of remedial actions.