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Constitutional Review in the Mega‐Leviathan: A Democratic Foundation for the European Court of Justice
Author(s) -
Hong Quoc Loc
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
european law journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1468-0386
pISSN - 1351-5993
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0386.2010.00529.x
Subject(s) - law , political science , legitimacy , democratic legitimacy , leviathan (cipher) , democracy , treaty , economic justice , european union law , european court of justice , constitutional court , legislation , preliminary ruling , foundation (evidence) , law and economics , sociology , european union , economics , politics , statistics , mathematics , constitution , economic policy
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) serves, among other things, as a constitutional court for the EU. This means that it possesses the legal right to strike down both EU and national laws it deems irreconcilable with treaty provisions. In the present article, we shall draw on Hans Kelsen's theory of democracy to argue that the ECJ's competence to review and invalidate legislation is, in fact, indispensable for the democratic legitimacy of the EU's legal system as a whole.