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Credible Commitment in Non‐Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of the European Agencies for Pharmaceuticals and Foodstuffs
Author(s) -
Krapohl Sebastian
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
european law journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1468-0386
pISSN - 1351-5993
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0386.2004.00229.x
Subject(s) - agency (philosophy) , european commission , european union , member states , business , commission , regulatory agency , order (exchange) , public administration , food safety , member state , political science , international trade , finance , medicine , philosophy , epistemology , pathology
The creation of more and more supranational regulatory agencies has been one of the most significant institutional developments in the European Union during the last decade. Usually, these agencies evolve from EU committees and take over most of their structures. Accordingly, like most EU committees and the Commission, regulatory agencies are not independent, but act under the control of the member states. The question is, how far do they indicate a credible commitment of the Member States to long‐term policy goals like health and consumer protection. This article compares the institutional structures and decision‐making rules of the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products and of the newly established European Food Safety Authority, in order to clarify the extent of credible commitment that the Member States show through the setting‐up of these agencies. It concludes that the commitment of the Member States in the foodstuff sector is not as deep as in the pharmaceutical sector, and that the creation of the European Food Safety Authority will not lead to a success story similar to that of the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products.