A lasdair M acIntyre's Analysis of Tradition

I argue that, in analysing the structure and development of moral traditions, M acIntyre relies primarily on K uhn's model of scientific tradition, rather than (as is held by at least two influential commentators) on L akatos' model. I unpack three foci of K uhn's conception of the sciences, namely: the ‘crisis’ conception of scientific development, what I call the ‘systematic conception’ of scientific paradigms, and the view that successive paradigms are incommensurable. I then show that these three foci are integrated into M acIntyre's account of the development of moral traditions with a surprising degree of faithfulness to K uhn. And crucially, I argue against the overall cogency of his account, given the disparities I pinpoint between scientific and moral traditions. My overall critique is, however, fundamentally friendly, since nothing I have to say invalidates the very notion of a moral tradition, and all I am calling for are less problematic construals of that notion.