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Kant on the Content of Cognition
Author(s) -
Tolley Clinton
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00483.x
Subject(s) - content (measure theory) , cognition , argument (complex analysis) , interpretation (philosophy) , sketch , epistemology , contrast (vision) , reading (process) , psychology , grasp , ant , cognitive science , cognitive psychology , philosophy , computer science , linguistics , artificial intelligence , mathematics , chemistry , computer network , biochemistry , algorithm , programming language , mathematical analysis , neuroscience
I present an argument for an interpretation of K ant's views on the nature of the ‘content [ I nhalt]’ of ‘cognition [ E rkenntnis]’. In contrast to one of the longest standing interpretations of K ant's views on cognitive content, which ascribes to K ant a straightforwardly psychologistic understanding of content, and in contrast as well to the more recently influential reading of K ant put forward by McD owell and others, according to which K ant embraces a version of R ussellianism, I argue that K ant's views on this topic are of a much more F regean bent than has traditionally been admitted or appreciated. I conclude by providing a sketch of how a better grasp of K ant's views on cognitive content in general can help bring into sharper relief what is, and what is not, at stake in the recent debates over whether Kant accepts a particular kind of cognitive content—namely, non‐conceptual content.