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G. E. Moore and Bad Faith
Author(s) -
Coleman Anthony
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00413.x
Subject(s) - false accusation , faith , philosophy , epistemology , bad faith , variety (cybernetics) , begging , psychology , theology , social psychology , computer science , artificial intelligence
G. E. Moore claimed to know a variety of commonsense propositions. He is often accused of being dogmatic or of begging the question against philosophers who deny that he knows such things. In this paper, I argue that this accusation is mistaken. I argue that Moore is instead guilty of answering questions of the form ‘Do I know p?’ in bad faith.

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