Premium
The Normativity of Content and ‘the Frege Point’
Author(s) -
Speaks Jeff
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2009.00361.x
Subject(s) - citation , point (geometry) , content (measure theory) , library science , computer science , mathematics , mathematical analysis , geometry
Sometimes, Geach puts the point in terms of the distinction between predication and assertion: one can predicate an expression of something without asserting that it is true of that thing. The reason why this is possible is that facts about what is predicated of what are facts about the meaning of the sentence in question; assertion, on the other hand, is one speech act among many which one can perform with a sentence. More generally, the Frege point is that there is a distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the speech acts that a sentence can be used to perform; one cannot infer that properties of the latter are properties of the former. Geach put the Frege point to use in arguing against, among other views, performative analyses of ethical sentences. The sort of performative analysis with which Geach was concerned gave the meaning of a predicate like ‘is good’ by saying that this predicate is used not to describe some object or event as having a certain property, but to perform the act of commending the object or event. Geach argued that such views run afoul of the Frege point by ignoring the fact that “the same term might occur without any change of sense in an unasserted occurrence of the proposition.” In such unasserted uses, Geach claimed, the speaker is not commending the object of which ‘good’ is predicated, even though ‘good’ is being used with its usual meaning. The performative analysis, Geach thinks, is therefore guilty of inadvertently changing the subject. It was supposed to be a view about the meanings of ethical terms; but it is really a theory about some speech acts assertoric uses of those terms can be used to carry out. One moves from the latter to the former only by ignoring the Frege point: the distinction between the meaning of a sentence and what assertoric uses of the sentence typically do — or, more generally, between meaning and speech act. Whatever one thinks of Geach’s argument against the performative analysis and its descendants, the Frege point is surely correct and important: the meaning of a