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On Epistemic Conceptions of Meaning: Use, Meaning and Normativity
Author(s) -
Whiting Daniel
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2008.00320.x
Subject(s) - meaning (existential) , whiting , sentence , epistemology , philosophy , original meaning , hacker , linguistics , computer science , fishery , fish <actinopterygii> , biology , operating system
Many philosophers hold that for an expression to possess meaning is for there to norms governing its use. By combining this with a further idea, namely that the relevant norms are epistemic, one arrives at an epistemic conception of meaning (EM). In this paper, I outline a problem for EM, which motivates a reassessment of the arguments in support of it. Accordingly, I consider a number of such arguments but find them to be unsuccessful. By way of diagnosis, I suggest that EM ultimately rests on a kind of act/object confusion. This in turn suggests a way in which one can accept the view that meaning is determined by norms of use without accepting that those norms are epistemic.