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Ownership and the Value of Political Connections: Evidence from China
Author(s) -
Wu Wenfeng,
Wu Chongfeng,
Rui Oliver M.
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
european financial management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.311
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1468-036X
pISSN - 1354-7798
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-036x.2010.00547.x
Subject(s) - politics , subsidy , value (mathematics) , state ownership , china , business , sample (material) , social connectedness , government (linguistics) , enterprise value , market economy , labour economics , economics , finance , emerging markets , political science , social psychology , computer science , law , psychology , linguistics , chemistry , philosophy , chromatography , machine learning
Abstract Research has found that political connectedness can have both positive and negative effects on firm value. To resolve these mixed findings, we investigate the impact of political ties conditional on ownership for a sample of Chinese firms over the period 1999–2006. We find that private firms with politically connected managers have a higher value and obtain more government subsidies than those without connected managers, whereas local state‐owned enterprises with connected managers have a lower value and employ more surplus labour than those without connected managers. Our results indicate that the effect of political ties is subject to firm ownership.