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Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation
Author(s) -
Hirshleifer David
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
european financial management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.311
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1468-036X
pISSN - 1354-7798
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-036x.2007.00437.x
Subject(s) - overconfidence effect , ideology , social psychology , psychology , salience (neuroscience) , reciprocity (cultural anthropology) , scapegoating , politics , mood , exploit , xenophobia , positive economics , economics , cognitive psychology , political science , computer security , computer science , law
I propose here the psychological attraction theory of financial regulation – that regulation is the result of psychological biases on the part of political participants – voters, politicians, bureaucrats, and media commentators; and of regulatory ideologies that exploit these biases. Some key elements of the psychological attraction approach are: salience and vividness, omission bias, scapegoating and xenophobia, fairness and reciprocity norms, overconfidence, and mood effects. This approach further emphasises emergent effects that arise from the interactions of individuals with psychological biases. For example, availability cascades and ideological replicators have powerful effects on regulatory outcomes.