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THE COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF IN A CUSTOMS UNION: VOTING, LOGROLLING, AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INTERESTS
Author(s) -
TAVARES SAMIA COSTA
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00322.x
Subject(s) - unanimity , veto , tariff , customs union , voting , majority rule , economics , government (linguistics) , public economics , european union , politics , international economics , international trade , political science , law , linguistics , philosophy
Missing from the analysis of customs unions has been a consideration of collective decision‐making by countries regarding the union's common trade policy. In the case of the common European external tariff, how governments voted was not public information. This paper uses a unique dataset to derive member states' tariff preferences, which are then used to establish the decision rule before 1987, when individual governments had veto power. Results indicate a principle of unanimity, as well as the presence of logrolling. The political equilibrium for the common external tariff is also illustrated to have shifted as a result of union enlargements.