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POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL CHECKS ON CORRUPTION: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENTS
Author(s) -
ALT JAMES E.,
LASSEN DAVID D.
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x
Subject(s) - divided government , presidential system , separation of powers , legislature , government (linguistics) , language change , supreme court , politics , state (computer science) , political science , law and economics , political corruption , executive branch , law , public administration , economics , art , linguistics , philosophy , literature , algorithm , computer science
This paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under a divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that a divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under a unified government, where the government cannot control itself.