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International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator
Author(s) -
Kaempfer William H.,
Lowenberg Anton D.,
Mertens William
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00130.x
Subject(s) - dictator , sanctions , opposition (politics) , autocracy , dictatorship , economic rent , loyalty , politics , economic sanctions , economics , bargaining power , political science , political economy , microeconomics , democracy , law
Wintrobe's (1990, 1998) dictatorship model is adapted to examine the impacts of economic sanctions on an autocrat. It is shown that the dictator's choice of the level of power, and the quantities of loyalty and repression used as inputs in the production of power, are affected by the type and magnitude of sanctions and by the impact of sanctions on the political effectiveness of opposition groups. Sanctions have direct and indirect effects on the prices of loyalty and repression as well as potentially generating rents that might be captured either by the dictator or by the opposition.