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A SIGNALING MODEL OF COMPETITIVE POLITICAL PRESSURES
Author(s) -
Lohmann Susanne
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1995.tb00110.x
Subject(s) - status quo , politics , collective action , action (physics) , status quo bias , political science , phenomenon , political economy , economics , law , epistemology , philosophy , physics , quantum mechanics
This paper models competitive political pressures as a signaling phenomenon. People participate in collective action in support of or against the status quo, or they abstain. Their actions and abstentions inform the decision of a policymaker who may overturn the status quo in favor of a policy alternative. By providing an informational microfoundation for the widely used reduced‐form “pressure production functions” and “political influence functions,” the analysis allows me to reexamine the role of the free rider problem in creating a bias towards vocal special interests. The signaling hypothesis finds empirical support with a study of pro‐ and anti‐Gulf War demonstrations that took place in San Francisco and Kansas City (Missouri) in early 1991.