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TRADE POLICY AND INDIRECT RENT SEEKING: A SYNTHESIS OF RECENT WORK †
Author(s) -
Leidy Michael P.
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1994.tb00090.x
Subject(s) - protectionism , incentive , rent seeking , margin (machine learning) , work (physics) , commercial policy , economics , process (computing) , international economics , public economics , international trade , microeconomics , political science , engineering , computer science , mechanical engineering , machine learning , politics , law , operating system
This paper synthesizes a body of work in trade theory and commercial policy. A common theme unifies this literature: The prospect of protection, institutionalized in the policy formation process and the rules for administered protection, can induce real changes in economic activity independent of whether actual barriers to trade have been imposed. These changes are designed to indirectly manage policy outcomes by either encouraging or defusing protectionist pressures. Thus firm conduct may be distorted by incentives to optimize on a politically‐determined margin and the evolution of protectionist events may be shaped by more than the direct lobbying efforts of interest groups.