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THE MARKET FOR CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. SENATE 1980–1986 *
Author(s) -
SNYDER JAMES M.
Publication year - 1993
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00076.x
Subject(s) - ideology , politics , point (geometry) , asset (computer security) , simple (philosophy) , financial economics , empirical evidence , positive economics , economics , market efficiency , political science , econometrics , law , computer science , computer security , epistemology , mathematics , philosophy , geometry
This paper tests a simple asset market model of campaign contributions, using data from recent U.S. Senate races. When applied to “investor” PACs, the model performs surprisingly well, and suggests that the contributions market is relatively efficient. When applied to “ideological” PACs, political parties, and individuals, the model is rejected. The results not only provide empirical support for the model, but also point out important differences in the apparent motives behind different types of contributions.