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ALTRUISM, EGOISM, AND THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS *
Author(s) -
Chirinko Robert S.
Publication year - 1990
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00034.x
Subject(s) - altruism (biology) , public good , ethical egoism , economics , voting , microeconomics , social capital , dual (grammatical number) , private good , comparative statics , public goods game , prosocial behavior , majority rule , public economics , capital (architecture) , positive economics , social psychology , sociology , political science , psychology , social science , art , literature , archaeology , politics , law , history
The economic approach to understanding human behavior has encountered serious difficulties when attempting to explain the private provision of public goods, such as voting and charitable contributions to large organizations. To gain insights into these important issues, this study takes an interdisciplinary approach. The individual is modeled formally in terms of dual egoistic/altruistic utilities, and the recursive relation between altruism and the existence and production of social capital is developed. The model is analyzed as a non‐cooperative game between the egoistic and altruistic selves. The socialized rational actor that results from the combination of social capital, dual utilities, and non‐cooperative behavior resolves a number of public goods paradoxes. Comparative statics and the dynamics of social capital formation are explored.