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Deterrence in Contests
Author(s) -
De Luca Giacomo,
Sekeris Petros G.
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
economica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.532
H-Index - 65
eISSN - 1468-0335
pISSN - 0013-0427
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2012.00940.x
Subject(s) - contest , deterrence (psychology) , economics , deterrence theory , corollary , outcome (game theory) , class (philosophy) , law and economics , microeconomics , political science , law , mathematics , epistemology , philosophy , pure mathematics
This paper explores the role of deterrence in contests. As a general rule, we show that for a deterrence strategy to be played by rational agents, it is necessary that the contest be destructive. We show for a very general class of functions that pure strategy deterrence equilibria where contestants deter one another do not exist. A corollary of this finding is that under fairly general conditions, agents should always be expected to engage in contests. Applied to international relations, our results imply that war is always a potential outcome despite deterrence attempts.