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The Effects of Screening and Monitoring on Credit Rationing of SMEs
Author(s) -
Agostino Mariarosaria,
Silipo Damiano B.,
Trivieri Francesco
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
economic notes
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.274
H-Index - 19
eISSN - 1468-0300
pISSN - 0391-5026
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0300.2008.00195.x
Subject(s) - credit rationing , endogeneity , incentive , competition (biology) , probit , rationing , sample (material) , probit model , economics , monetary economics , selection bias , value (mathematics) , business , econometrics , microeconomics , interest rate , statistics , ecology , health care , chemistry , mathematics , chromatography , biology , economic growth
In this paper, we seek to empirically assess which determinants of the capability and incentives of banks to screen and monitor firms are significant in explaining credit rationing to Italian SMEs. After testing for the presence of non‐random selection bias and the potential endogeneity of some determinants of interest, the probit model results we obtain suggest that the average banking size and the multiple banking relationship phenomenon are statistically significant factors affecting credit rationing, presumably through their impact on the aforementioned banks' capability and incentives. Other potential determinants of banks' incentives to monitor and screen, such as local banking competition and firm' capacity to collateralize, are never significant. However, when we split the sample according to the level of competition in credit markets, we find that the estimated marginal effects of all significant determinants of interest are larger in absolute value than those obtained when using the whole sample.