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Rent seeking and collusion in the military allocation decisions of Finland, Sweden, and Great Britain, 1920–38 1
Author(s) -
ELORANTA JARI
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
the economic history review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.014
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1468-0289
pISSN - 0013-0117
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0289.2008.00427.x
Subject(s) - economic rent , collusion , rent seeking , qualitative analysis , economics , business , public economics , market economy , politics , qualitative research , political science , microeconomics , sociology , law , social science
Analysis of military acquisition policies in Finland, Sweden, and Great Britain in the period from 1920 to 1938 produces evidence of rent seeking, both quantitative and qualitative, in all three cases. The Finnish institutional environment offered the most extensive rents and collusion opportunities, which translated into tangible price advantages for domestic producers. The Swedish and British domestic producers operated under more efficient institutions and thus had to settle for more moderate rents. Evolving institutional environments determined the extent of the rent seeking.

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