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PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY, PROTECTIONISM AND THE CASE OF NAFTA
Author(s) -
Quartner David
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
economic affairs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.24
H-Index - 18
eISSN - 1468-0270
pISSN - 0265-0665
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0270.2006.00615.x
Subject(s) - protectionism , free trade , liberalization , politics , free trade agreement , public interest , international trade , public choice , public opinion , economics , political process , power (physics) , political science , political economy , international economics , law , market economy , physics , quantum mechanics
Public choice theory suggests that the political process has an in‐built tendency to promote protectionist measures favoured by organised interest groups rather than trade liberalisation that would benefit society as a whole. But the example of the North American Free Trade Agreement shows that political campaigns in support of free trade can successfully mobilise public opinion to neutralise the power of special‐interest groups. Therefore, it is imperative that politicians and others who believe in free trade remind the public of its benefits.

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