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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS AND THE FRENCH/DUTCH REJECTION OF THE EU CONSTITUTION
Author(s) -
Migué JeanLuc
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
economic affairs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.24
H-Index - 18
eISSN - 1468-0270
pISSN - 0265-0665
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0270.2006.00613.x
Subject(s) - federalist , tragedy of the commons , constitution , government (linguistics) , politics , commons , rent seeking , political science , political economy , economics , common pool resource , public administration , law and economics , law , microeconomics , linguistics , philosophy
In seeking to protect their failed social model by rejecting the EU constitution, French and Dutch voters ironically contributed to promoting the very ‘liberal’ order they misunderstand and despise. When, as in federalist politics, functions overlap, two levels of government compete for the same votes in the same territory in the supply of similar services. Not unlike the tragedy of the commons in oil extraction, it is in the interest of both political authorities to seek to gain votes in implementing the programme first. The overall equilibrium supply of public services is excessive and both levels of government have a tendency to invade every field. Short of effective constitutional limits on the powers of the central government, a more decentralised EU offers an opportunity to overcome the common‐pool problem of multi‐level government.