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Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space: A Corrigendum 1
Author(s) -
Dekel Eddie,
Lipman Barton L,
Rustichini Aldo,
Sarver Todd
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00759.x
Subject(s) - axiom , axiom independence , mathematical economics , independence (probability theory) , flexibility (engineering) , representation (politics) , mathematics , space (punctuation) , expected utility hypothesis , state space , pure mathematics , computer science , geometry , statistics , operating system , politics , political science , law
Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) (henceforth DLR) axiomatically characterized three representations of preferences that allow for a desire for flexibility and/or commitment. In one of these representations (ordinal expected utility), the independence axiom is stated in a weaker form than is necessary to obtain the representation; in another (additive expected utility), the continuity axiom is too weak. In this erratum we provide examples showing that the axioms used by DLR are not sufficient, and provide stronger versions of these axioms that, together with the other axioms used by DLR, are necessary and sufficient for these two representations.