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Reciprocal Upper Semicontinuity and Better Reply Secure Games: A Comment
Author(s) -
Bagh Adib,
Jofre Alejandro
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00724.x
Subject(s) - mathematical economics , reciprocal , nash equilibrium , class (philosophy) , regular polygon , mathematics , computer science , artificial intelligence , geometry , philosophy , linguistics
A convex, compact, and possibly discontinuous better reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium. We introduce a very weak notion of continuity that can be used to establish that a game is better reply secure and we show that this notion of continuity is satisfied by a large class of games.