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The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost‐Perfect Monitoring
Author(s) -
Hörner Johannes,
Olszewski Wojciech
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00717.x
Subject(s) - folk theorem , mathematical economics , mathematics , economics , game theory , repeated game , equilibrium selection
We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost‐perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n ‐player games that satisfy the usual full‐dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap‐talk communication between players and no public randomization device.