Premium
The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
Author(s) -
Bernheim B. Douglas,
Rangel Antonio,
Rayo Luis
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00701.x
Subject(s) - legislature , word (group theory) , power (physics) , political science , economics , linguistics , law , philosophy , physics , quantum mechanics
We examine legislative policy making in institutions with two empirically relevant features: agenda setting occurs in real time and the default policy evolves. We demonstrate that these institutions select Condorcet winners when they exist, provided a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals. In policy spaces with either pork barrel or pure redistributional politics (where a Condorcet winner does not exist), the last proposer is effectively a dictator or near‐dictator under relatively weak conditions.