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Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant‐Strategy Implementation
Author(s) -
Bikhchandani Sushil,
Chatterji Shurojit,
Lavi Ron,
Mu'alem Ahuva,
Nisan Noam,
Sen Arunava
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00695.x
Subject(s) - monotonic function , mathematical economics , mathematics , economics , mathematical optimization , mathematical analysis
We characterize dominant‐strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant‐strategy incentive compatible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W‐Mon). The W‐Mon requirement is the following: If changing one agent's type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed) changes the outcome under the social choice function, then the resulting difference in utilities of the new and original outcomes evaluated at the new type of this agent must be no less than this difference in utilities evaluated at the original type of this agent.