Large Robust Games | Zendy

Kalai Ehud | Zendy

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Large Robust Games

Author(s) -

Kalai Ehud

Publication year - 2004

Publication title -

econometrica

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7

H-Index - 199

eISSN - 1468-0262

pISSN - 0012-9682

DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00549.x

Subject(s) - variety (cybernetics) , mathematical economics , economics , complete information , differential game , differential (mechanical device) , computer science , microeconomics , mathematics , mathematical optimization , engineering , artificial intelligence , aerospace engineering

With many semi‐anonymous players, the equilibria of simultaneous‐move games are extensively robust . This means that the equilibria survive even if the simultaneous‐play assumption is relaxed to allow for a large variety of extensive modifications. Such modifications include sequential play with partial and differential revelation of information, commitments, multiple revisions of choices, cheap talk announcements, and more.

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