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Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
Author(s) -
Cripps Martin W.,
Mailath George J.,
Samuelson Larry
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
econometrica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.7
H-Index - 199
eISSN - 1468-0262
pISSN - 0012-9682
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00496.x
Subject(s) - imperfect , reputation , perfect information , microeconomics , repeated game , economics , sustainability , game theory , computer science , political science , ecology , philosophy , linguistics , law , biology
We study the long‐run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring.