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INTEREST‐RELATIVE INVARIANTISM AND KNOWLEDGE FROM IGNORANCE
Author(s) -
LUZZI FEDERICO
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01414.x
Subject(s) - premise , proposition , epistemology , ignorance , philosophy , intuition , trilemma , closure (psychology) , law , political science , economics , monetary policy , monetary economics
Abstract The principle of Counter‐Closure embodies the widespread view that when a proposition is believed solely as the conclusion of single‐premise deduction, it can be known only if the premise is also known. I raise a problem for the compatibility of Jason Stanley's Interest‐Relative Invariantism (IRI) with Counter‐Closure. I explore the landscape of options that might help Stanley resolve this tension and argue that a trilemma confronts Stanley: he must either (i) renounce a key intuition that lies at the foundation of his view; or (ii) admit into his epistemology an IRI‐specific novel brand of Gettier case; or (iii) abandon Counter‐Closure.