Premium
INTENTIONAL ACTION AND THE UNINTENTIONAL FALLACY
Author(s) -
WASSERMAN RYAN
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01410.x
Subject(s) - fallacy , commit , action (physics) , epistemology , simple (philosophy) , set (abstract data type) , moral responsibility , philosophy , computer science , physics , quantum mechanics , database , programming language
Much of the recent work in action theory can be organized around a set of objections facing the Simple View and other intention‐based accounts of intentional action. In this paper, I review three of the most popular objections to the Simple View and argue that all three objections commit a common fallacy. I then draw some more general conclusions about the relationship between intentional action and moral responsibility.