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FOUNDATIONALLY JUSTIFIED PERCEPTUAL BELIEFS AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SPECKLED HEN
Author(s) -
PACE MICHAEL
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01374.x
Subject(s) - prima facie , foundationalism , determinacy , subject (documents) , philosophy , epistemology , property (philosophy) , perception , mathematics , computer science , mathematical analysis , library science
Many epistemologists accept some version of the following foundationalist epistemic principle: if one has an experience as if p then one has prima facie justification that p. I argue that this principle faces a challenge that it inherits from classical foundationalism: the problem of the speckled hen. The crux of the problem is that some properties are presented in experience at a level of determinacy that outstrips our recognitional capacities. I argue for an amendment to the principle that adds to its antecedent the requirement that the subject have a recognitional capacity with respect to the given property.