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FIRST‐PERSON BELIEF AND EMPIRICAL CERTAINTY
Author(s) -
MARTENS DAVID B.
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01361.x
Subject(s) - introspection , epistemology , sketch , object (grammar) , certainty , philosophy , attribution , exposition (narrative) , consciousness , psychology , first person , social psychology , psychoanalysis , computer science , art , linguistics , literature , algorithm
This is a critical exposition and limited defence of a theory of first‐person belief transiently held by Roderick Chisholm after giving up the early haecceity theory of Person and Object (1976) and before adopting the late self‐attribution theory of The First Person (1981). I reconstruct that ‘middle’ theory as involving what I call a ‘hard‐core’ approach to de re belief and I rebut objections concerning epistemic supervenience and abnormal consciousness. In my rebuttals, I sketch a variant of the middle theory according to which first‐person belief essentially involves the believer's introspective acquaintance with herself.