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IS MEANING FRAUGHT WITH OUGHT?
Author(s) -
WHITING DANIEL
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01354.x
Subject(s) - meaning (existential) , appeal , expression (computer science) , epistemology , subject (documents) , philosophy , sociology , computer science , law , political science , library science , programming language
According to Normativism, what an expression means has immediate implications for how a subject should or may (not) employ that expression. Many view this thesis as imposing substantive constraints upon theories of linguistic meaning. In this paper, I shall not consider that view; instead, I shall address the prior issue of whether or not one should accept Normativism. Against certain recent prominent lines of attack common to a number of different anti‐Normativist discussions, I shall defend both the Normativist thesis and an attempt to appeal to a certain platitude in its support.