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FRANCESCOTTI ON FISSION
Author(s) -
JOHANSSON JENS
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01350.x
Subject(s) - counterexample , epistemology , personal identity , philosophy , identity (music) , fission , branching (polymer chemistry) , mathematical economics , computer science , mathematics , combinatorics , physics , chemistry , aesthetics , nuclear physics , self , organic chemistry , neutron
Most versions of the psychological‐continuity approach to personal identity (PCA) contain a ‘non‐branching’ requirement. Recently, Robert Francescotti has argued that while such versions of PCA handle Parfit's standard fission case well, they deliver the wrong result in the case of an intact human brain. To solve this problem, he says, PCA‐adherents need to add a clause that runs contrary to the spirit of their theory. In this response, I argue that Francescotti's counterexample fails. As a result, the revision he suggests is not needed.