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DAVIDSON AND FIRST‐PERSON AUTHORITY: PARATAXIS AND SELF‐EXPRESSION
Author(s) -
JACOBSEN ROCKNEY
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01339.x
Subject(s) - meaning (existential) , expression (computer science) , attribution , psychology , semantics (computer science) , epistemology , linguistics , sociology , philosophy , social psychology , computer science , programming language
Donald Davidson's explanation of first‐person authority turns on an ingenious account of speakers' knowledge of meaning. It nonetheless suffers from a structural defect and yields, at best, expressive know‐how for speakers. I argue that an expressivist strand already latent in Davidson's paratactic treatment of the semantics of belief attribution can be exploited to repair the defect, and so to yield a plausible account of first‐person authority.