Premium
THE LOTTERY PARADOX AND OUR EPISTEMIC GOAL
Author(s) -
DOUVEN IGOR
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00316.x
Subject(s) - lottery , intuition , epistemology , philosophy , economics , mathematical economics , microeconomics
Many have the intuition that the right response to the Lottery Paradox is to deny that one can justifiably believe of even a single lottery ticket that it will lose. The paper shows that from any theory of justification that solves the paradox in accordance with this intuition, a theory not of that kind can be derived that also solves the paradox but is more conducive to our epistemic goal than the former. It is argued that currently there is no valid reason not to give preference to the derived accounts over the accounts from which they come.