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CAN RATIONALIST ABDUCTIVISM SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION?
Author(s) -
BEEBE JAMES R.
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00314.x
Subject(s) - interpretation (philosophy) , epistemology , resolution (logic) , key (lock) , inductive method , a priori and a posteriori , philosophy , computer science , law , political science , artificial intelligence , linguistics , computer security , teaching method
According to Laurence BonJour, the problem of induction can be solved by recognizing the a priori necessity that inductive conclusions constitute the best explanations of inductive premises. I defend an interpretation of the key probability claims BonJour makes about inductive premises and show that they are not susceptible to many of the objections that have been lodged against them. I then argue that these purportedly necessary probability claims nevertheless remain deeply problematic and that, as a result, BonJour's proposal fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the problem of induction.