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A (SELLARSIAN) KANTIAN CRITIQUE OF HUME'S THEORY OF CONCEPTS
Author(s) -
LANDY DAVID
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00302.x
Subject(s) - epistemology , philosophy , argument (complex analysis) , chemistry , biochemistry
In A Treatise of Human Nature , Hume attempts to explain all human cognition in terms of impressions, ideas, and their qualities, behaviors, and relations. This explanation includes a complicated attempted reduction of beliefs , or judgments, to single ideas. This paper attempts to demonstrate one of the inadequacies of this approach, and any of its kind (any attempted reduction of judgments to their constituent parts, single or multiple) via an argument concerning the logical forms of judgment found implicitly in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason , and more explicitly in the works of Wilfrid Sellars.