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ARE INTENTIONS REASONS?
Author(s) -
BRUNERO JOHN
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00301.x
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , relation (database) , circuit breaker , philosophy , law and economics , sociology , computer science , engineering , medicine , database , electrical engineering
This paper presents an objection to the view that intentions provide reasons and shows how this objection is also inherited by the more commonly accepted Tie‐Breaker view, according to which intentions provide reasons only in tie‐break situations. The paper also considers and rejects T. M. Scanlon's argument for the Tie‐Breaker view and argues that philosophers might be drawn to accept the problematic Tie‐Breaker view by confusing it with a very similar, unproblematic view about the relation between intentions and reasons in tie‐break situations.