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BALD‐FACED LIES! LYING WITHOUT THE INTENT TO DECEIVE
Author(s) -
SORENSEN ROY
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00290.x
Subject(s) - lying , assertion , deception , rhetorical question , psychology , illusion , social psychology , epistemology , philosophy , linguistics , cognitive psychology , computer science , medicine , radiology , programming language
Surprisingly, the fact that the speaker is lying is sometimes common knowledge between everyone involved (the addressee, the general audience, bystanders, etc.). Strangely, we condemn these bald‐faced lies more severely than disguised lies. The wrongness of lying springs from the intent to deceive – just the feature missing in the case of bald‐faced lies. These puzzling lies arise systematically when assertions are forced. Intellectual duress helps to explain another type of non‐deceptive false assertion: lying to yourself. In the end, I conclude that the apparent intensity of our disapproval of non‐deceptive lies is a rhetorical illusion.