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EMPIRICAL EQUIVALENCE IN THE QUINE‐CARNAP DEBATE
Author(s) -
LOOMIS ERIC J.
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00273.x
Subject(s) - quine , george (robot) , epistemology , philosophy , interpretation (philosophy) , criticism , equivalence (formal languages) , perspective (graphical) , computer science , linguistics , law , artificial intelligence , political science
Alexander George has put forward a novel interpretation of the Quine‐Carnap debate over analyticity. George argues that Carnap's claim that there exists an analytic‐synthetic distinction was held by Carnap to be empty of empirical consequences. As a result, Carnap understood his position to be empirically indistinguishable from Quine's. Although George defends his interpretation only briefly, I show that it withstands further examination and ought to be accepted. The consequences of accepting it undermine a common understanding of Quine's criticism of Carnap, and I argue that it is difficult to find a perspective from which Quine can criticize Carnap in a non‐question‐begging way.