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RELIABILIST JUSTIFICATION (OR KNOWLEDGE) AS A GOOD TRUTH‐RATIO
Author(s) -
ADLER JONATHAN E.
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00236.x
Subject(s) - skepticism , epistemology , relation (database) , lottery , closure (psychology) , philosophy , psychology , computer science , law , economics , political science , database , microeconomics
Fair lotteries offer familiar ways to pose a number of epistemological problems, prominently those of closure and of scepticism. Although these problems apply to many epistemological positions, in this paper I develop a variant of a lottery case to raise a difficulty with the reliabilist's fundamental claim that justification or knowledge is to be analyzed as a high truth‐ratio (of the relevant belief‐forming processes). In developing the difficulty broader issues are joined including fallibility and the relation of reliability to understanding.