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AGENT CAUSATION AND THE PROBLEM OF LUCK
Author(s) -
CLARKE RANDOLPH
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00234.x
Subject(s) - luck , causation , argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , action (physics) , philosophy , face (sociological concept) , law and economics , positive economics , economics , chemistry , biochemistry , physics , linguistics , quantum mechanics
On a standard libertarian account of free will, an agent acts freely on some occasion only if there remains, until the action is performed, some chance that the agent will do something else instead right then. These views face the objection that, in such a case, it is a matter of luck whether the agent does one thing or another. This paper considers the problem of luck as it bears on agent‐causal libertarian accounts. A view of this type is defended against a recent and challenging version of the argument from luck.