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Blameworthiness, Vice, and The Objectivity of Morals
Author(s) -
Montague Phillip
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00187.x
Subject(s) - counterexample , epistemology , objectivity (philosophy) , action (physics) , philosophy , mathematics , physics , discrete mathematics , quantum mechanics
The following thesis is defended: whether actions are morally required is an objective matter – that is, independent of the beliefs, intentions, etc. with which the actions are preformed. This thesis needs defending because it seems vulnerable to certain counterexamples. One approach to dealing with these counterexamples centers on the concept of blameworthiness, but this approach is flawed. An alternative approach is developed that relies on the concept of a vicious action. And although it too centers on the concept of blameworthiness, it lacks the flaws that are present in the original approach.