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LOGICAL TRUTH IN MODAL LOGIC
Author(s) -
McKeon Matthew
Publication year - 1996
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.1996.tb00175.x
Subject(s) - sentence , modal logic , non classical logic , modal , logical consequence , reading (process) , truth table , criticism , computer science , modal operator , philosophy , epistemology , possible world , truth condition , accessibility relation , logical truth , algorithm , artificial intelligence , linguistics , literature , art , chemistry , polymer chemistry
In this paper, I consider the criticism due to Hartry Field, John Pollack, William Hanson and James Hawthorne that the Kripkean requirement that a logical truth in modal logic be true at all possible worlds in all quantified model structures is unmotivated and misses some logical truths. These authors do not see the basis for making the logical truth of a modal sentence turn on more than the model structure given by one reading of the modal operator(s) which occur in the sentence. The primary goal here is to motivate the Kripkean requirement.