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INFLUENCING THE PUBLIC AND EFFICIENCY IN BUREAUCRATIC PROVISION
Author(s) -
Vaidya Samarth
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
pacific economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 33
eISSN - 1468-0106
pISSN - 1361-374X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2009.00442.x
Subject(s) - overproduction , pooling , bureaucracy , production (economics) , economics , public economics , public good , budget constraint , microeconomics , political science , law , computer science , biochemistry , chemistry , artificial intelligence , politics , enzyme
. In the present paper a public bureau can extract additional budgetary allocations, not only by misreporting its production cost to its oversight committee but also by ‘influencing’ the perceptions of the public at large. I juxtapose the bureau's ability to influence the public with its ability to misreport to the oversight committee, and find that influencing the public might support an efficient level of production by invoking a separating equilibrium. However, a pooling equilibrium involving either overproduction or underproduction of output cannot be ruled out. Accordingly, overproduction could occur even when the bureau cares only about extracting excess budget and not increasing output per se.