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WITHIN‐TEAM COMPETITION IN THE MINIMUM EFFORT COORDINATION GAME
Author(s) -
Fatas Enrique,
Neugebauer Tibor,
Perote Javier
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
pacific economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 33
eISSN - 1468-0106
pISSN - 1361-374X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2006.00312.x
Subject(s) - competition (biology) , baseline (sea) , coordination game , economics , microeconomics , ecology , oceanography , biology , geology
. We report the results of an experiment on a continuous version of the minimum effort coordination game. The introduction of within‐team competition significantly increases effort levels relative to a baseline with no competition and increases coordination relative to a secure treatment where the pay‐off‐dominant equilibrium strategy weakly dominates all other actions. Nonetheless, within‐team competition does not prevent subjects from polarizing both in the efficient and the inefficient equilibria.